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The emergence of medieval markets has commonly been seen in the literature as 
hampered by lack of contract enforcement and archaic institutions like merchants’ 
communal responsibility. Merchants traveling to a different marketplace to trade there 
could be arrested and held liable for any debts incurred by any merchant from their 
hometown. We revisit a traditional literature in legal history, which argued that mar-
ket making and market privileges arose precisely in the context of communal respon-
sibility and its regulation through trade treaties between cities. Communal responsibil-
ity was effective in enforcing credit contracts and enabled merchants to use bills of 
exchange in long distance trade even if reputation effects were absent. We implement 
communal responsibility in the Lagos and Wright (2005) matching model of money 
demand, assuming that preference shocks follow a two-state Markov chain. We derive 
conditions under which cash and credit in the anonymous matching market coexist. 
For fixed but sufficiently low cost of credit, agents will pay with cash in low-quality 
matches, and use cash and credit in high-quality matches. The use of credit in the 
communal responsibility equilibrium reduces the money holdup in the matching mar-
ket and thus leads to Pareto improvements. We argue that historically, financial mar-
ket making using communal responsibility was effective in overcoming the cash con-
straints in cross-city trade, while locking traders into a de-facto firm with their own 
merchant guild’s members.  
Keywords: Communal responsibility, matching, money demand, credit 
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I. Introduction 
How did financial instruments develop in late medieval Europe, and why? Financial 
contracts can only arise when trust or legal enforcement are strong enough to break 
the anonymous, one-shot character of barter and cash-in-advance transactions. Early 
medieval trader, dealing with their anonymous counterparts in an environment hardly 
protected by any enforcement, could not easily rely on repeated transactions giving 
rise to reputation effects. Nor could they hope for contract enforcement by local au-
thorities, whose reach was ineffective and at best only local. Under those circum-
stances, transactions that were asynchronous across space and time were ruled out, or 
limited to ethnic and religious minorities small enough to make reputation effects 
work, see Greif (1993).  
 
Nevertheless, starting in the late 13
th century, precisely such transactions are being 
observed. Traders in Italy, as well as in Flanders, began to use credit letters to pay for 
deliveries in inter-city trade, or to remit money from one place to the other even if no 
underlying transaction of goods is being observed. Through the marketplaces of 
Northern France, Flanders, Germany along the Rhine, these methods gradually spread 
out to the north of Europe, and were adopted e.g. by the cities of the Hansa for their 
trade across the Baltic and the North Sea. Soon enough, there was also a growing 
practice of camouflaging credit between merchants of the same place as money remit-
tances from one city to the other. A legal literature emerged that dealt with the admis-
sibility of such purely financial transactions, which violated the ban on interest im-
posed by the Catholic Church. More importantly, a growing number of cases in dis-
pute was being taken to the courts.  
   3
This is what interests us here. The present paper looks into the enforceability of credit 
transactions under the narrow legal constraints of the medieval marketplace – a city 
republic or often enough only a small market town, whose jurisdiction hardly ex-
tended beyond the city limits. Despite these restrictions, financial relations began to 
flourish everywhere across Europe.  
 
The emergence of letters of credit and the financial instruments they involved into, 
like bills of exchange, money remittances, and on the British Isles, checks, has been 
studied intensely by legal and economic historians working in the tradition of the His-
torical School of the 19
th and early 20
th century. Their research looked into the possi-
ble legal sources of these instruments, as well as the interregional compatibility of 
town statutes and laws regulating their use. While there seems to have been no 
agreement among these scholars about the legalistic issues involved, these studies 
provide a rich sample of individual cases, as well as a broad meta-sample through its 
review of the pertinent legal literature itself, which goes back at least to the 16
th cen-
tury. The qualitative but rich evidence sampled in these studies can thus be considered 
representative of commercial and legal practice prevailing at the time. 
 
Financial instruments, as far as their use was recorded, developed in the context of 
legal regulation by market and city authorities almost from the beginning. This is par-
ticularly manifest in the case of the big medieval and early modern fairs. These fairs 
mostly took place at regular frequencies, and developed a surprisingly rich market 
microstructure, ranging from centralized matching and brokering to detailed regula-
tions about end-of-market clearing operations and the exclusion of aftermarket trans-
actions from court enforcement – or even their outright ban. Fostered by their privi-  4
leged status, the major fairs developed their own payment and clearing systems. This 
process would eventually culminate in annual European trans-market clearing fairs, 
dedicated exclusively to financial market transactions. However, while these fairs 
played a prominent role in shaping the financial map of Europe, a more complete pic-
ture is obtained by studying the less prominent everyday operations among merchants 
across cities. Our objective is to provide an economic rationale for the emergence of 
credit facilities in these environments. 
 
The obvious hurdle to overcome for financial instruments under the institutional con-
straints of the Middle Ages and Early Modern Europe is that of lacking enforcement 
across space. If traders located in different places wanted to conclude financial 
agreements with one another, and if forces other (or stronger) than reputation were 
needed, instruments had to be devised that made it possible for merchants from City 
A, who had claims against merchants from City B, to seek and obtain enforcement at 
home, i.e. in the court of City A. The legal institution of communal responsibility in-
deed provided this: a city court would hold the merchants from any given other city 
collectively liable for the debts of their fellow citizens. In that way, their assets, to the 
extent they were within the court’s reach, would serve as collateral. As a conse-
quence, communal responsibility effectively bound all merchants of a given city to-
gether in some kind of forced mutual insurance, with obvious implications for the in-
centives of these traders to form guilds, restrict access, impose sanctions, and monitor 
each other’s financial conduct closely.  
 
Studying the evidence collected by lawyers and legal historians on credit and the 
emergence of financial instruments, we find that the emerging credit instruments were   5
indeed tailored to exploit communal responsibility. We see the same structure arising 
from the very first credit letters down to the bill of exchange. In many cases, a mer-
chant would draw on a fellow citizen living in the creditor’s jurisdiction as an inter-
mediary for payment of his debt. By communal responsibility, the intermediary would 
be held liable for the debts of his fellow citizen
1. Hence, the creditor could sue the in-
termediary for payment in the creditor’s court, while the intermediary could sue the 
debtor in the debtor’s court. This way, communal responsibility played a favorable 
role in collateralizing credit across jurisdictions. 
 
Communal responsibility also had important negative aspects. Traveling merchants 
arriving in a city might find their merchandise confiscated and themselves being taken 
prisoner, just in order to pay for claims against a fellow citizen, whose legitimacy 
might even be in dispute. This had potentially disruptive effects on trade relations 
wherever territorial states were absent, see Greif (2004). The creation of compact ter-
ritories with unified jurisdictions was a major step forward towards easy enforceabil-
ity of claims and of financial market integration, see North (1981). However, in Cen-
tral Europe as well as in Italy, where territorial fragmentation was prevalent until the 
19
th century, collective responsibility remained the rule, to be broken only by trade 
and payments agreements between political authorities
2. In the present paper, we will 
highlight the evolution of financial instruments under these conditions, in which terri-
                                                 
1 Especially in Italy, there existed also a four-way bill of exchange, in which one trader made a cash 
payment to another in City A, to be redeemed by a third trader who would receive payment from a 
fourth trader in City B. 
2 In international law, the principle of collective responsibility survives to this day. As we write this 
paper, a Swiss oil broker attempted to confiscate pictures at an exhibition of Russian art in the Swiss 
city of Zurich, in order to be compensated for a failed oil deal. The same broker is reported to have 
previously obtained injunctions against his former Russian business partners in several countries, po-
tentially threatening trade with seizures or sanctions. The Swiss government in the end resorted to na-
tional security concerns to override the claim, see New York Times, “Swiss Oil Broker Tries to Seize 
Russian Art to Collect Debt”, November 16, 2005.   6
torial integration came far too late to provide a good explanation for financial market 
integration. 
 
How collateralization may work to support the use of credit as a means of payment 
across jurisdictions is also an interesting issue from a theoretical standpoint. Monetary 
economists working in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Kiyotaki and 
Wright (1991) have studied the use of money in a matching framework, in which 
buyers and sellers meet randomly for anonymous, one-shot exchanges. He, Huang and 
Wright (2003) devise a matching model in which money and credit coexist. In their 
model, money is indivisible, giving rise to credit transactions. In what seems closest 
to the problem of interest to us here, Faig (2004) and Faig and Jerez (2005) interpret 
the matching setup as a village economy, in which cash is used transactions across 
villages, and credit for transactions within villages. In their model, however, all credit 
serves purely for financial and insurance motives; there is no trade credit involved.  
 
In the present paper, we contribute to this research, drawing on the canonical setup of 
Lagos and Wright (2005). We investigate credit transactions, not within but across 
cities in a matching framework that we interpret as a village economy as in Faig 
(2004). The crucial issue in this context is collateralization and enforceability of credit 
transactions when the individual match is one-shot among anonymous trading part-
ners. Communal responsibility in fact provides the required collateralization, thus 
supporting an equilibrium in which credit is employed.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II delves deeper into the history 
of credit instruments in Europe and puts their evolution in the context of communal   7
responsibility. Section III adapts the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework and charac-
terizes (restricted) social planner and decentralized market solutions with and without 
communal responsibility. Section IV discusses the results and places them in the con-
text of modeling alternatives and their possible historical interpretations, tracking his-
torical analogs to modeling devices that have become popular in the matching litera-
ture, such as the “big family” assumption of Shi (1997). Section VI concludes with 
implications for further research. 
 
II. History 
To remit money from one place to another, 13th century Italians had developed the 
business of “campsores”, money changers who would receive cash payment in one 
location, and pay out the equivalent in a different location. The term for these money 
remittances, “cambium” (change), soon became synonymous for a wider class of 
payment transactions, in which credit was provided, see Freundt (1899). Along the 
Mediterranean, remittance and credit contracts would often be notarized, and two par-
allel letters of credit issued to be sent by separate mail, to make the presenter’s claim 
more credible. In Western and Central Europe, court registers would assume the same 
task. These credit letters were themselves not yet a negotiable title that constituted an 
enforceable property right. Scholars in the tradition of the Historical School argued 
over the origins of the bill of exchange (see Goldschmidt (1891), Schaps (1892), 
Schaube (1898), Freundt (1899); for a brief summary of the argument and rich addi-
tional evidence see de Roover (1953)). The tendency of the discussion was to empha-
size the continuity with Roman law, and to refute a claim by Goldschmidt (1891) that 
the observable “cambium” could be readily identified with the modern bill of ex-
change. Still, this older research agreed that money transfer and credit operations   8
across cities occurred early, often, and were regularly brought to and enforced by the 
courts.  
 
When these assets became tradable has continued to be a matter of dispute. Usher 
(1943), van der Wee (1963) argued for a rather late beginning, citing court cases from 
Flanders from the early 16th century. From then on, the holder of a bill of exchange 
was entitled to payment, no matter what the underlying original creditor/debtor rela-
tion was. de Roover (1953) finds tradability of bills of exchange in Italy to be a rare 
exception before the 16th century. Munro (1991), Munro (1994) argues that tradabil-
ity of bills of exchange was the norm under the Law Merchant (albeit not under the 
Common Law) in medieval England already in the 14th century. However, bills of 
exchange were apparently used predominantly in foreign trade, especially with the 
Low Countries. For domestic transactions, easier, seemingly less sophisticated in-
struments were in use. Comparatively little attention has been paid to developments in 
Germany. This may partly be a consequence of van der Wee’s (1963) hypothesis that 
Germany’s financial markets were connected to the international market only in the 
16th century. It is also partly due to large-scale loss of archival documents pertaining 
to major places like Cologne or Frankfurt.  
 
Recent research by Rothmann (1998) has filled the gap for the city of Frankfurt, 
partly by consulting archival sources from Frankfurt’s trade partners, often smaller 
cities throughout the German-speaking countries whose records survived World War 
II. Rothmann cites evidence for the use of bills of exchange, and their transfer from 
one party to the other, for as early as the late 14
th century. In the first half of the 15
th 
century, bills of exchange payable in Frankfurt regularly included the clause “wer den   9
brief innhat” (who the bearer of the letter is) (Rothmann, p. 335, p. 484). This seems 
remarkably close to similar stipulations on English credit letters issued under the Law 
Merchant at the same time (see Munro, 1991).  
 
Like elsewhere in Europe (on the prominent cases of the Campagne fairs, later Lyon, 
Genua, and Geneva, see Boyer-Xambeu, Deleplace and Gillard (1991)), Frankfurt’s 
trade fairs soon became nationwide clearing institutions. For a sample of cities from 
Germany and Switzerland, Rothmann documents that among the bills of exchange, 
mortgaged rents, and other credit and payment instruments registered in the respective 
city courts, those payable in Frankfurt or at the time of the Frankfurt fairs are domi-
nant. Thus, the fairs synchronized and integrated financial markets in all of Southern 
and Central Germany, even for payments that were not physically due in Frankfurt 
itself.  
 
Transferring bills of exchange (or other letters of credit) was thus a common phe-
nomenon on the Frankfurt market in the 14
th century. As Frankfurt was strongly inte-
grated with Venice (probably more so than with the Low Countries, where Cologne 
acted as an intermediary), the practice must have been less unusual in Northern Italy 
than de Roover (1953) would imply. However, von Stromer (1976) notes that the 
Frankfurt fairs as a financial market benefited from a trade and payments embargo by 
the Holy Roman Empire against Venice in 1412/13 and again from 1418-1433. This 
may have set off an isolated development in Germany, albeit only temporarily. Ap-
parently, financial instruments were well developed in most areas of Europe in the 
15
th century, and agents were able to pay without cash, and to transform one form of 
financial asset into another both over time and space.   10
 
Transferable or not, credit letters and other financial instruments, like rents, critically 
depended for their practical use on enforceability. Notarization of credit letters was 
the norm in Southern Europe, see Freundt (1899), de Roover (1953). In central and 
Western Europe, registration in court or city registers prevailed, see Munro (1991). 
City courts convened to enforce payment, or to reach a binding settlement between 
both parties, and their rulings were apparently effective enough to secure the continu-
ing use of financial instruments. The question is why this is. 
 
The easy case is probably medieval England. Under English Common Law, mer-
chants registering their claim in the courts of York, London, or Bristol would have the 
right to seize the debtors’ assets in all of England in the case of default (Munro, 
1991). The enforceability of claims across a large, unified jurisdiction was undoubt-
edly a major advantage for England’s commercial development (Greif, 2004). Begin-
ning in the mid-14
th century, enforceability of European-style law merchant claims 
was assured by giving merchant courts applying these rules the right to seize assets. 
Again, this gave England an advantage, and Munro (1991, 1994) argues that the Law 
Merchant gradually crowded out the more expensive Common Law debt instruments 
among English merchants.  
 
Merchants on the European continent had to cope with fragmented jurisdictions. 
Feuds, wars, and city bankruptcies inhibited the flow of goods and capital across loca-
tions. Feuds, wars, and city bankruptcies inhibited the flow of goods and capital 
across locations further. Still, financial flows were surprisingly undisturbed by such 
events, and the limitation of local jurisdictions hardly seems to have been a problem.   11
In 1410, the city of Cologne banned its citizens from attending the Frankfurt fairs in 
order to force Frankfurt to lower its fees. Only those having to settle their debts or 
collecting debt in Frankfurt were allowed to go (Rothmann, 1997, p. 422). While debt 
default by institutional debtors, such as cities or territories, was a problem, individual 
default was not, at least no more than within a given jurisdiction. 
 
The reason for this was the threat of communal responsibility. Under this seemingly 
archaic institution, merchants would be held liable outside of their own city for the 
debts of their fellow citizens. Cities and marketplaces throughout Europe, particularly 
in Germany and Italy (but also in Flanders and France) adopted stringent rules and 
court practices on how to deal with bad debts by foreigners. The typical sanction was 
to take reprisals against the fellow citizens of a defaulting foreigner, be it through sei-
zure of any goods or, if need be, outright imprisonment. The legal rules governing 
communal responsibility and the rights of reprisal were studied intensively by legal 
historians from the Historical School, see e.g. Wach (1868), Kisch (1914), Planitz 
(1919).  
 
Medieval sources mention communal responsibility among merchants in the 12
th cen-
tury, usually as an obstacle to merchant activity, and a bad practice that had to be ab-
dicated or at least regulated Planitz (1919, p.97, 171). Cases of wild seizure and vio-
lence were apparently frequent. Merchants would soon avoid places that were notori-
ous for such wild reprisals. City charters regulated and restricted the application of 
communal responsibility, although the practice was not abdicated altogether, see 
Wach (1868). Mutual privileges aimed to provide safe passage for merchants, e.g. be-
tween Flanders and places in Germany in the late 12
th century Planitz (1919, p. 168).   12
Similar agreements limiting reprisals existed between Lorraine and the Low Coun-
tries, and in numerous city charters and treaties among cities along the Rhine.  
 
Legal historians concluded from examining hundreds of city charters that communal 
responsibility was ubiquitous on the European continent, and that its legal regulation 
was practically identical everywhere. (Kisch (1914), Planitz (1919)). Typically, evi-
dence on the justification of the debt had to be procured, as well as of a failed previ-
ous attempt to enforce payment in the debtor’s city court. Imperial law in Germany 
(whose enforceability was, however, notoriously low) included this clause as early as 
1231, and city statutes everywhere repeated it.  In Italy, cities maintained public 
blacklists of individual defaulters and of cities having failed to protect creditor rights.  
 
The typical procedure included some amount of debtor rights. Although regulations 
often involved a right for the creditor to act on the spot before calling the judge, the 
rule was that the case had to be decided by the judge before dawn, otherwise the ar-
rested merchant would be released Kisch (1914, p. 40). During major fairs and mar-
kets, judges would be walking the streets day and night to provide on-the-spot rulings, 
and all other court activity would be suspended while the fairs lasted. 
 
Indeed, the major fairs enjoyed privileges of free access. Conditions on the Cham-
pagne fairs were special because of repeated interventions by the king (see Thomas 
(1977). Visitors to the less important Frankfurt fairs were exempt from communal re-
sponsibility for all debts owed elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire (but of course 
not in Frankfurt itself), see Brübach (1994) with examples. This gave debts owed in 
Frankfurt senior rank over other debts, and certainly contributed to the privileged   13
status of the Frankfurt fairs within the payment system evolving in Germany since the 
14
th century. Merchants drawing a bill of exchange on the place of a major fair thus 
delegated enforcement to the city authorities of that fair. With its large network of 
trade and payments relations, its capabilities of enforcement were superior to anyone 
else’s. We also see that disputes about bills payable in Frankfurt were settled, not in 
Frankfurt but in the debtors’ courts, as in the examples of Basel and Constance. This 
is in line with the typical way communal responsibility was regulated, as Frankfurt 
courts would only take a case that had not been settled there previously. 
 
These networks were magnified by the indirect links that the smaller places provided. 
The trade partners of 14
th and 15
th century Frankfurt for which Rothmann (1998) stud-
ied the records in detail include, inter alia, Constance, Basle, Cologne and Antwerp. 
In each of these cities, the town records include numerous payment agreements be-
tween locals and foreign merchants, which were due in Frankfurt. The network ex-
tends quickly: other clearing places mentioned in Constance included Geneva, Ven-
ice, Ravensburg, Zurzach, Zurich and many more. The books of Basle mention Lyon, 
Strassbourg, Brugge, Mechelen and Antwerp as clearing places besides Frankfurt. 
The contract partners of Basle’s merchants were from Berne, Cologne, Mecheln, 
Strassbourg, Augsburg, Ravensburg and again from Frankfurt. The foreign partners of 
merchants from Constance were from Strassbourg, Ulm, St. Gallen, Ravensburg, 
Nuremberg, Basle, and, again, Frankfurt. The liabilities were either trade credits or 
bill of exchanges. In such a multilateral network, towns cared about the enforcement 
of contracts, independently of where the trade took place and independently of 
whether the citizen was a creditor or a debtor. 
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Communal responsibility as a backstop when trade treaties and payment arrangements 
failed was surprisingly long-lived. In the following, we provide two cases from the 
late 16
th and 17
th century, in which the enforcement of liabilities still worked on a in-
ter-town basis. We provide micro evidence of the town of Linz in Upper Austria and 
from St. Gallen in Switzerland. During the 17
th century, both towns played an impor-
tant role as inter-regional markets for goods as well as of bills of exchange.  
 
The case of St. Gallen is a proposed unilateral change in the town’s trade treaties from 
1661 (see on the following Simon (1974)). It documents that reprisals between cities 
were still in use. Town officials sought to change statutes that guaranteed equal treat-
ment of foreigners and locals in bankruptcy cases involving bills of exchange. The 
proposed new statutes would give preferential treatments to the locals of St. Gallen. 
These suggestions were intensively discussed and attacked by the local merchants. 
They argued that such rules would destroy the well-established position of St. Gallen 
as an international clearing place for bills of exchange. It would violate the trading 
agreements that existed with all major trading places like Augsburg, Nuremberg, 
Hamburg, Erfurt and Strassbourg, and the town would have to expect heavy reprisals. 
Merchants from St. Gallen would be discriminated not only in Germany, but also in 
France and Italy and wherever they tried to use bills of exchange. In this context, the 
merchants mention the statutes of the major European finance centers, Venice, Am-
sterdam, Hamburg, Barcelona, Rome, Genua, etc.  
 
The fairs of Linz document the ongoing use of the laws of reprisal during the 17
th cen-
tury (on the following see Rausch (1969)). In the 16
th century, Linz, situated in the 
heartlands of Habsburg’s Austrian possessions, had become an important fair and fi-  15
nancial market. The fair had its high time during the 17
th century, when it was a clear-
ing place for Central and Eastern Europe. During this period, the statutes regulating 
the use of reprisals were renewed and confirmed by the Austrian emperor several 
times. The arguments put forward by the town officials in favor of the reprisal option 
are illuminating. They argued that reprisals were absolutely necessary to guarantee 
that merchants pay their liabilities. As the application of the existing rules had become 
lax, debtors’ willingness to pay had declined. The right to apply reprisal laws would 
guarantee the competitiveness of the Linz fairs in Europe. Support for the legislation 
came also from the merchants themselves. In 1649, the visitors to the fairs set up and 
signed a petition to the Emperor in support of the proposed measure. The list included 
traders from Augsburg, Nuremberg, Cologne, Vienna, Geneva, Salzburg and many 
other places. Apparently, communal responsibility supported an outcome that was 
more preferable to merchants than any feasible alternative. 
 
III. Money and credit demand in a village economy with search 
1. The basic setup 
The following is a matching model of the demand for money and credit, adapted with 
minor changes from Lagos and Wright (2005). We assume a city [village] economy as 
in Faig (2004) and Faig and Jerez (2005), in which agents match with each other to 
trade city-specific goods. In our version of this model, agents may employ both 
money and/or bills of exchange as a medium of payment in inter-city trade. We are 
interested in characterizing equilibria under various assumptions on the enforceability 
of such payments, and want to seek conditions under which the use of credit and the 
coexistence of money and credit are supported.    16
 
Let there be a finite, countable number N of cities, each inhabited by a continuum di 
of agents on the unit interval, such that total population size is again N. For most of 
the paper we will adopt a sloppy notation and suppress the di index. Agents in each 
city produce a perishable city-specific good. While this good is not consumed in that 
city itself, it is a consumer good in all other N – 1 cities, and is a perfect substitute for 
the goods produced in all other cities. This setup is one of complete specialization and 
gives rise to the need for trade. 
 
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), agents in these cities also produce and consume a 
general, non-tradable good, which is traded on a Walrasian market within the city and 
is perishable as well. The only store of value in the Lagos/Wright setup is money, 
which has no intrinsic value and carries no interest. We add interest-bearing bills of 
exchange, which are issues by the agents.  
 
As to city-specific tradable goods, agents derive utility u (q
b) from consuming quan-
tity  q
b.  u is assumed twice differentiable,  0 ' ' , 0 ' < > u u , and satisfies 
0 ) ( ' , ) ( , ) 0 ( ' , ) 0 ( → ∞ ∞ → ∞ ∞ → −∞ → u u u u
3. Agents can produce this good accord-
ing to a homogeneous, convex cost function  ) ( s q N  where  0 ' ' , 0 ' ≥ > N N .  
 
Agents have utility  ) (C U  over the consumption C of the non-tradable general good, 
with the same properties as above and the additional regularity condition  1 *) ( ' = C U  
for some  0 *> C . There is disutility from producing these general goods, which is as-
                                                 
3 We set  −∞ → ) 0 ( u  to rule out autarky equilibria, in which there is no consumption of special 
goods, and hence no need for trade.   17
sumed to be linear in their output Y. Without loss in generality, the cost or disutility of 
producing Y is assumed equal to Y, which implies that output is measured in (dis-) 
utils. This linearity assumption, introduced and discussed in detail in Lagos and 
Wright (2005), is crucial for the tractability of the problem, as it precludes wealth ef-
fects and ensures closed form solutions. A discussion of its meaning and of possible 
alternative is given further below.  
 
 
We assume that the market for tradable goods is cleared first and the market for non-
tradables afterwards. As in Faig and Jerez (2004), we interpret the market for special 
goods as a market for tradables. This market is characterized by an anonymous ran-
dom matching process between sellers and buyers from different cities, with exoge-
nous matching probabilities. Every morning, agents become buyers or sellers. Sellers 
set out to produce the tradable good according to cost function  ) (
s q N  and await the 
arrival of foreign buyers, while domestic buyers go out to another city to match with 
that city’s sellers there, and derive utility from the quantity bought, U (q
b). 
 
We assume that the market for tradable goods is cleared first and the market for non-
tradables afterwards. As in Faig and Jerez (2004), we interpret the market for special 
goods as a market for tradables. This market is characterized by a matching process 
between sellers and buyers from different cities, with exogenous matching probabili-
ties. Every morning, agents become buyers or sellers. Sellers set out to produce the 
tradable good according to cost function  ) (
s q C  and await the arrival of foreign buy-
ers, while domestic buyers go out to another city to match with that city’s sellers 
there, and derive utility from the quantity bought, U (q
b). The probability of becoming   18
a seller and successfully being matched with a foreign buyer is π . The probability of 
becoming a buyer and being matched successfully with a foreign seller is,  π − 1 . For 
simplicity, we set both probabilities equal to one half. Nothing depends on the equal-
ity of these probabilities, except for notational simplicity. We disregard the possibility 
unsuccessful matches (although their introduction would be straightforward) 
 
Not all successful matches are good ones. Conditional on a buyer/seller match estab-
lishing itself, α  denotes the probability that match quality is high. α  may also be in-
terpreted as a preference shock as in Faig and Jerez (2004). Associated with α  is util-
ity  ) (q U from consuming q . In contrast, a bad match occurs with conditional prob-
ability  α − 1 . It leads to lower utility  ) ( ) ( q U q U <  and hence to lower consumption 
q q < .  
 
The matching setup in this city economy becomes interesting once money and a fi-
nancial sector are introduced. We assume two assets, money m and one-period inter-
est-bearing commercial bills b. As all goods in the economy are perishable, these two 
assets are the only stores of value. While we assume the stock of money to be given 
and constant, agents can create commercial bills with their signature, just like in eve-
ryday life when employing a checkbook. As money has no intrinsic value, agents 




                                                 
4 Notice that this does not rule out gold or silver as monetary media. Adding utility of holding money 
(gold) would complicate the notation but not affect the results fundamentally.   19
Our specialization and matching setup across cities and agents rules out barter (tech-
nically speaking, we assume there is no double coincidence of wants). Agents wanting 
to consume tradables must leave their hometown to buy the goods. Agents producing 
stay at home and cannot consume the tradable home good. As a consequence, the only 
feasible matches in this market are between buyers and sellers from different cities. 
Nothing much depends on ruling out double coincidence of wants, as long as the 
complete specialization setup is retained. 
 
We assume that there exist limits of enforcement across cities. In the extreme, en-
forcement may be absent altogether. Given the random one-shot matching of a con-
tinuum of anonymous agents, individual reputation effects that might help to ensure 
payment in cross-city trade are absent. However, agents are assumed to be tagged 
with their city identity. That is, although individual agents are anonymous, their city 
of origin is known. Therefore, reputation, tit-for-tat etc. equilibria may exist across 
cities if city authorities are allowed to behave strategically. We mention the possibil-
ity of such equilibria merely as a reference case and focus on the non-cooperative out-
come instead.  
 
Absent inter-city enforcement, agents in cross-city commerce would be reduced to 
using money in their transactions. The setup then generates precautionary money de-
mand high enough to cover the needs from the highest expected preference shock. 
However, this is not the only non-cooperative equilibrium. The model also opens 
room for an enforcement technology, which we call city-specific reprisals. Such repri-
sals can be imposed unilaterally. The presence of city-specific reprisals leads to a wel-




 be the amount that any individual wants to pay using bills of exchange. As the 
transaction volume in each match is dependent on the realization of the state (good, 
bad), the desired amount of payment by bills may be state dependent, too. Likewise, 
let  m ~  be the amount of cash payments the same individual wants to make. Payment 
by cash carries the implicit cost  m i ~ ⋅ , as cash bears no interest. Payment by bills of 
exchange is assumed to carry a fixed resource cost T. This cost is assumed to be lost 
to the economy, i.e. it does not accrue to sellers as revenue. 
 
Thus, payments in cross-village trade may be effected in either cash or bills: 
} , { ~ , ~ ~ ~ q q q q b m ∈ ≥ +  
 
As money and commercial paper are the only stores of value, each agent’s initial 
wealth is equal to his or her initial money and bond holdings: 
b m a + =  
where b  are the bond holdings inherited from the last period, before an agent goes out 
and makes financial decisions, e.g. by underwriting new bonds. Together, this leads to 
the following setup: 
 
]} ( ) ( ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ) 1 (
)] ( ) ( ( ) ( )[ 1 (
)] ) 1 ( ] ~ [ ( ) ( ( ) ( [ ) 1 (
)] ) 1 ( ] ~ [ ( ) ( ( ) ( [ max{ )} ( {
b D b i a d a W q C
b D b i a d a W q C
b D m D m m D b i T D a d a W q U
b D m D m m D a i T D a d a W q U a V E
+ + + + − − − +
+ + + + − − +
− − − − − + ⋅ − − + − +












































b b q q
b b q q
D
b b q q







a nonnegativity constraint on money holdings: 
0 ≥ m  
and a transversality condition on bond holdings to rule out bubbles and Ponzi 
schemes: 





b E β  
Every agent maximizes the value function dependent on initial wealth, E{V(a)}. Buy-
ers get matched with sellers at probability  5 . = π . Matches lead to high outcomes q  
with probability α  and to low outcomes q with probability  α − 1 . A buyer takes out 
utility  ) (q U  and incurs expenditure d  with probability α , or utility  ) (q U  and ex-
penditure  d with probability  α − 1 . If a buyer spends d  paying partly or fully with 
credit (and if this is supported in equilibrium), the indicator variable is activated, 
1 = D , and the fixed cost of issuing bills of exchange,  0 ≥ T , is incurred. A buyer 
paying with bills of exchange in the morning will have to pay interest on these bills in 
the afternoon. A buyer’s initial wealth a is reduced by the amount of resources paid, 
which is equal to  b m d + = ~  in a good match. If the buyer makes parts or all of his 
payments in bills of exchange, the indicator variable is active,  1 = D , and the interest 
a buyer earns on his initial bond holdings,  b i ⋅ , is reduced by the interest due on bills   22
of exchange issued while buying,  b i ⋅ . The same is true with  1 = D  and interest pay-
ments  b i ⋅  if a buyer employs bills of exchange in a low-quality match.  
 
Sellers get matched with buyers at probability  5 . ) 1 ( = = − π π . If match quality is 
high, which again happens with probability α , a seller gets to produce quantity q  at 
cost  ) (q C , with revenues equal to d . If a seller receives parts or all of the payment in 
bills of exchange, the indicator variable is active,  1 = D , and the seller receives inter-
est payments  b i ⋅  on these bills, which add to the earnings on the initial stock,  b i ⋅ . If 
a bad match is realized, the lower quantities q are produced, and revenue d  is also 
lower.  1 = D  if a seller received bills of exchange in a low-quality match, with   b i ⋅  
as the associated interest payments on these bills. The continuation values 
...) ( ...), ( − − − − d a W d a W , measuring the values in the afternoon, reflect the reduc-
tion of the initial endowment by the purchases made. In case part of all of the pur-
chase has been paid with bills of exchange, indicated by the qualitative variables 
, , D D  a buyer’s initial endowment is further reduced by the fixed cost of using bills 
of exchange, T. This cost is assumed to be lost; it does not accrue to sellers as reve-
nue. 
 
A central feature of the Lagos/Wright setup is the afternoon market in general goods. 
According to the timing convention, the afternoon home market opens after all sellers 
and buyers return from inter-city trade, and after interest on initial bond holdings is 
paid. For buyers, these interest payments are further reduced through the amount of 
bills of exchange they issued in the morning market. For sellers, the interest payments   23
are increased by any bills of exchange they receive as a means of payment
5. The value 
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where C is consumption and Y is production of the general good.  
 
Maximizing with respect to Y and substituting for Y at the market clearing optimum 
yields: 
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This quasilinear preference structure of the Lagos/Wright (2005) model gives the 
agents’ continuation value, W (a), desirable properties: maximization of V (a’) with 
respect to a’ is now independent of a, excluding wealth effects. In addition, W (a) can 
be written as a linear function in a: 
a W a W + = ) 0 ( ) ( 
This greatly simplifies the solution of the matching and bargaining setup. We follow 
the Nash bargaining setup of Lagos and Wright (2005), where θ  is buyer i’s bargain-
ing power. There are two Nash bargains to be considered, one in the case of a “good” 
match, the other in the case of a “bad” match. Except for the difference in transaction 
                                                 
5 Discounting of the value functions W (.) could be introduced without substantially affecting the re-
sults.   24
volume d, however, both problems are analogous to each other. The threat points are 
given by the continuation values  ) (a W  (identical for unmatched buyers and sellers) 
that would apply in the case of no match at all: 
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Thanks to the linearity of the continuation values, the bargaining problem simplifies 
to: 
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As can be seen, the bargaining problem and the size of the surplus vary not only with 




Lemma 1:  From the FONCs of this problem, we obtain  *) ( ' *) ( ' ~ q N q u = . The sec-
ond-order conditions ensure that ∞ < < * 0 q.  
Proof: see Appendix. 
2. The demand for money and credit 
Before finding equilibria, it remains to be determined under which conditions pay-
ment with cash or with bills of exchange could occur. Under the assumptions made 
above, cash and credit are perfect substitutes. For each agent, the match qualities de-  25
fine a Markov chain of transaction volumes  } ; {
~
d d d ∈ , and in each state, the cheaper 
medium of payment will be preferred.  
 
(a) A creditless economy, all inter-city payments in cash 
We first look into the case where no credit is used in any state,  0
~
= b . Then, all trans-
actions need to be carried out in cash:  } ; {
~ ~ d d d m ∈ ≥ . As money carries no interest, 
its user cost Cm is the interest burden on the transactions volume. So long as the utility 
of the highest possible transaction is higher than its interest burden, precautionary 
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In a pure cash economy, the agent’s problem becomes: 
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Consequently, the bargaining problem is:   26
θ θ − − + + ⋅ − − − + 1 )] ( ) ~ ( ~ [ )] ( ) ~ ( ) ~ ( [ a W m a W q n a W m a W q u  
which, due to the linearity of W (.), becomes: 
θ θ − + ⋅ − − 1 ] ~ ~ [ ] ~ ) ~ ( [ m q n m q u  
 
In this form, the bargaining problem is exactly as in Lagos and Wright (2005). From 
the first-order conditions of this problem, we obtain:  *) ( ' *) ( ' ~ q N q u =  as in Lemma 1. 
 
(b) Coexistence of cash and credit: necessary conditions 
Cash and credit may coexist in inter-city payments under two assumptions about cost 
(if such an equilibrium exists, which is yet to be determined). For bills of payment to 
be a candidate medium of payment, the expected cost of using bills in a “good” match 
must fall short of the expected interest savings from cash in advance left unused when 
a low-quality match is encountered: 
 
Assumption 1:  ] [ ) 1 ( m m i T − ⋅ − < α α  
 
The left-hand side of this condition is the expected fixed cost of using bills of ex-
change. The right hand side is the probability of a low-quality match,  , 1 α −  multi-
plied with the interest cost of the cash  m m −  that would be left unused if a buyer en-
counters a low-quality match.  
 
Also, we want the fixed cost of using bills to be positive: 
 
Assumption 2:  0 > T  
   27
Proposition: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, optimal money demand (if supported in 
equilibrium) is characterized by the following properties: 
(a) Money demand is positive at  q m = , irrespective of the realization of q ~. 
(b) Gross demand for bills of exchange equals  ] [
~
q q b − =α α . 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
The savings from using credit – if there are any in equilibrium, which is yet to be de-
termined – come from the fact that credit is only used in a contingency, i.e. if match 
quality and transaction volumes are high. The use of bills of exchange allows agents 
to lower their money demand by  m m − . Assumption 1 states that this reduction pays 
if the expected cost of using bills of exchange falls short of the expected cost of hold-
ing  m m − . If using credit was costless, money would be driven out of circulation al-
together. Assumption 2 precludes such a situation.  













Figure 1 represents the situation graphically. As long as the demand for money in a 
low-quality match is sufficiently small, there is a large wedge between the interest 
savings from not holding precautionary money demand for a good match and the 
fixed cost of paying with credit. If credit were costless, it would drive out money al-
together; the feasible area would equal the whole triangle spanned by the interest sav-
ing condition. On the other hand, with growing fixed cost of paying with bills of ex-
change the feasible range gets smaller and smaller. It is zero if the expected fixed cost 
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Figure 1: Coexistence of money and credit   29
The agent’s problem in an economy characterized by coexistence of cash and credit 
becomes: 
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Consequently, the bargaining problem in a high-quality match becomes: 
θ θ − − + + + + + ⋅ − − − − + + − + 1 )] ( ] [ ) ( [ )] ( ]) [ ] [ ( ) ( [ a W b b i b m a W q n a W b b i T b m a W q u
 
which simplifies to: 
θ θ − + + + + ⋅ − − − + + − 1 )] ( [ )] ( ) ( ) ( [ b b i b m q n b b i T b m q u  
From the first-order conditions from this problem we obtain:  *) ( ' *) ( ' q N q u =  [the 
proof runs analogously to the proof of Lemma 1].  
 
In a low-quality match, the bargaining problem is: 
θ θ − − + + + ⋅ − − − − + 1 )] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( ) ( [ a W b i m a W q n a W b i m a W q u . 
From the first-order conditions from this problem we obtain:  *) ( ' *) ( ' q N q u = . Note 
that as u  and u are different utility levels, the optimal output levels will also differ. 
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3. Equilibrium 
(a) A Restricted Social Planner Problem 
We proceed gradually towards characterizing equilibrium in this city economy. The 
first step is to study a social planner’s solution, in which the incentive problems per-
taining to the use of credit are ruled out. However, this is evidently a restricted prob-
lem, as the bargaining solutions in inter-city trade may not be Pareto-efficient. Our 
use of a central planner solution can be rationalized as restricted in the sense that the 
social planner is not free to impose a different price setting mechanism. Let  di i
j ) ( λ  
be the weight of agent i of city j in this restricted social planner’s problem. Further-
more, let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the social planner then considers the prob-
lem: 
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In this equilibrium, we have the following solutions for buyers’ money and credit de-
mand, as laid out in Proposition 1:   31
} , { ~ , ~ ~
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Given the probabilities for high and low quality matches, α  and α − 1 , respectively, 
given also the continuity of agents, a law of large number applies, and proportion α  
of the agents matched is in a good match, while proportion  α − 1  is in a bad match. 
Together, we find that total money demand equals: 
 
q q q m = − + = ) 1 ( ~
aggr α α  
 
Supply and demand of bills of exchange is equal to: 
 
0 ) ( ) (
~
aggr = − + − − = q q q q b α α  
 
i.e. bills of exchange (or inside money, which is what they are) are in zero net supply. 
The gross supply of bills of exchange is equal to the proportion of good matches in 




q q bgross − =α  
 
Together, the demand for outside and inside money is: 
 
q q b m gross α + = +
~ ~  
 
which equals total output in the economy.    32
 
(b) Decentralized market solution, no collective responsibility 
Next we characterize equilibria in a decentralized economy, assuming for the moment 
that no collective responsibility exists, and hence no reprisals take place if debtors fail 
to honor their bills of exchange. As there is a continuum or anonymous individual 
agents, individual reputation effects or other strategies that could support a coopera-
tive equilibrium are ruled out: the inter-city payment system collapses into a cash in 
advance economy. As a consequence, 
 








This holds true if we assume that city governments cannot interact strategically, just 
as individuals in this setup cannot. As there is a countable, finite number of cities N, 
we cannot rule out strategic interactions like coalition formation, reputation, tit for tat 
strategies, and the like. To the extent that city governments behave strategically and 
engage in such behavior, the folk theorem points to infinitely many equilibria that 
may establish themselves, and that dominate the non-cooperative solution sketched 
here in terms of welfare. Indeed, European history offers rich accounts of city leagues 
that alternately privileged and fought each other, and that had fluctuating member-
ships. If N is high we would indeed expect such equilibria to be rather unstable. While 
we fully acknowledge the possible relevance of such equilibria, they are not our pri-
mary focus of interest. What we highlight here is the possibility of mimicking a fully   33
cooperative outcome [or a restricted social planner solution] in the context of non-
cooperative behavior. 
 
(c) Collective Responsibility as an Enforcement Device 
We now introduce collective responsibility into this framework. As mentioned earlier, 
collective responsibility means that all agents of a city can be held liable for one an-
other in inter-city trade. This implies that if any bill of payment has been defaulted on, 
the creditor’s city immediately sanctions this by seizing the resources of some other 
representative of this city
6. Let b
~
be a defaulted bond presented to an agent while 
trading abroad. In our setup, an agent out of town is always a buyer
7. With money 
holdings of this buyer equal to m , this is also the amount to be seized from the agent 
in reprisal against his fellow citizen’s default.  If the agent had no way of recovering 
the payment from his fellow citizen, the buyer’s value function of the agent under no 
enforcement, 
NE
b V , is: 
 
) ( ) 0 ( m a W U V
NE
b − + = ,   no enforcement in afternoon markets 
 
However, with full enforcement in local markets, upon returning home in the after-
noon, the agent is able to enforce payment from the agent who defaulted in the first 
place. The buyer’s value function under full enforcement at home, 
NE
b V , then is:  
 
                                                 
6 In the previous section we noted that city courts would typically require the plaintiff [i.e. the creditor] 
to prove that the claim had been impossible to enforce in the defendant’s [i.e., the debtor’s] court. De-
fault in this sense would imply refusal of the debtor’s home court to adequately deal with the case. 
7 This could easily be relaxed, allowing for matches with double coincidence of wants as in Lagos and 
Wright (2005).   34
) ( ) 0 ( a W U V
FE
b + = ,    full enforcement in afternoon markets 
 
which is identical to the value function of an unmatched agent. Evidently, this gives 
any agent who is presented with a defaulted bill, i.e. who is taken liable for his fellow 
citizen, an incentive to recover the payment after returning home. In other words, the 
agent becomes the enforcement agent of his host city upon returning home. 
 
We have already seen that under collective responsibility, an agent held liable for the 
default of his fellow citizen has an incentive to recover his loss from the defaulter. As 
the defaulted sum is  m m m b ≠ − = ) (
~
, it may take more than one act of reprisal for the 
creditor city to fully recover the defaulted credit. In each of this act, the loss to the 
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The first term is the agent’s expected utility from getting matched and consuming. 
The second term is the money sum taken from the agent in reprisal. This sum may be 
equal to the original claim (if small enough), or fall short of it. A city government tak-
ing reprisals will seize assets (i.e. the money they brought into town) of more than one 
fellow citizens of a defaulter citizen until the full amount is met. Hence, any individ-
ual loss from taking reprisals will exceed the original claim. The same is true a fortiori 
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Here, s is a factor equal to or greater than one that depends on the number of [measure 
of] agents held liable to satisfy a single claim. Under full enforceability in the home 
market, all agents held liable abroad will reclaim their losses from the defaulter in the 
afternoon market. 
 
In comparison, the gain from defaulting for an agent is: 
 
{ 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 4 42 1
default   from   loss   s Agent'
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The LHS of this inequality is the agent’s gain from defaulting on a bill of exchange 
signed when shopping out of town. The RHS of the expression is the same amount 
again plus the compensation payable to the victims of reprisal, which equals the 
deadweight loss from their being excluded from the outside market for that period. As 
can be seen, the net gain from defaulting is negative. Hence, under collective reprisal 
and collective responsibility, there is no incentive to default on bills of exchange, so 
that – within the narrow confines of our setup, which excludes bankruptcy for other 
reasons – default does not occur in equilibrium. As a consequence, the equilibrium 
under reprisal fully supports the use of bills of exchange, and precautionary money 
demand equals: 
 
q q q mCR = − + = ) 1 ( aggr α α  
 
while the net supply of bonds is zero:   36
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In short, the equilibrium under collective responsibility replicates the (restricted) so-
cial planner equilibrium. 
 
IV. Discussion 
The setup of the previous section depends critically on the linearity of the value func-
tions, which excludes wealth effects and permits the considerations underlying Propo-
sition 1. There are several established ways of achieving linearity of  ) (a W . The one 
we followed in the previous section is the afternoon market for general (in our setup: 
non-traded) goods proposed by Lagos and Wright (2005); which is based on quasilin-
ear preferences. Other mechanisms have been devised in the literature, and all could 
give rise to historically meaningful applications in our context. This section presents 
two of those alternative approaches briefly and provides a discussion of their possible 
interpretations.  
 
One paradigm is the extended family setup introduced by Shi (1997). In this frame-
work, each family consists a continuum of agents that pool their resources, and among 
which there exist no incentive problems. Under this risk sharing assumption and as-  37
suming the family is diversified over all economic activities, the extended family is 
fully insured against risk, and no aggregate wealth effects exist. In our setup, the ex-
tended family assumption would imply that the family as the basic decision making 
unit is pooled over sellers and buyers, so that wealth effects on the family as a whole 
from trading with other cities are absent. As a consequence, the device of a second, 
afternoon market becomes unnecessary. Under an extended family assumption, the 
basic value function maximization problem holds not just in expectation but, through 
the law of large numbers, as a deterministic relationship. Hence, under all realizations 
the continuation value of an extended family is constant.  
 
Surprisingly, from an historian’s perspective, the extended family setup is an empiri-
cally relevant concept and not just an artifact created for analytical convenience. 
Communal responsibility has itself been interpreted by legal historians as an institu-
tion originating from family feuds, see e.g. Planitz (1919). Family firms, frequent 
since the late Middle Ages, were indeed one way to overcome principal-agent prob-
lems, especially in long-distance trade – which is precisely what interests us here.  
 
However, the connection between the extended family and the firm goes even further. 
Building on the work of legal historians on the origins on the firm, one of us, Boerner 
(2005), shows that the contractual relations characterizing early firms were indeed 
modeled on medieval family trusts, by which an indivisible family possession, such as 
a manor, would become the jointly owned asset of the heirs, forcing them to pool all 
their other assets and receiving a quasi-fixed rent in return. 
   38
Applying this logic to the problem of collective responsibility, it is obvious that both 
the extended family and the firm are stronger contractual relationships than mere col-
lective responsibility towards a third party. In fact, as pointed out in Boerner (2005), 
collective responsibility itself is not a precursor of the firm. Instead, the firm origi-
nates in to solve what in the model of the previous sections is a problem with the line-
arity of the agents’ continuation value. 
 
A second, related concept in the money matching literature that helps to introduce 
linearity into the continuation values W (.) is the idea of Faig (2004) that before enter-
ing a match, each agent can insure the state-dependent outcome within their home 
city. In our context where match quality follows a two-state Markov chain, insurance 
premium μ  buys actuarily fair state-dependent payoffs such that: 
 
q q ) 1 ( α α μ − + =  
 
Under this insurance scheme, agents’ budget constraints become state-invariant; i.e. 
agents have a fixed income no matter what the outcome of their inter-city trade is. 
Again, under this assumption the concept of an afternoon market can be dispensed 
with. This insurance framework is very similar to invoking an extended family – or a 
firm.  Agents trading across cities and representing firms would in fact face such a 
state-invariant budget constraint. Of course, the feasibility of such a scheme would 
inextricably depend on the tightness of the firm’s internal contractual relationships to 
deal with the obvious incentive problems. Again, however, the insurance assumption 
is more than just an analytical device adopted out of convenience. There is evidence   39
that early modern firm contracts indeed sought to implement fixed-income schemes 
with low-powered incentives but full liability of any agent. 
 
However, setting up extended families or firms (or a combination of both) in the 
framework of the previous sections comes at a potential cost. As soon as we assume 
that families or firms have finite measure, strategic behavior and nontrivial dynamic 
equilibria are introduced. In an extended family, the family, not the individual, is the 
basic decision maker. Hence, strategic interactions between families will occur, be it 
within a city or (again assuming a finite number of cities) across cities. The same is 
true in the case of state-contingent insurance contracts for all agents of one city. This 
contract essentially makes the city collective the basic decision unit, and strategic in-
teractions between cities should then be observed. Historical evidence for both phe-
nomena is abundant. Our own approach to modeling inter-city trade deliberately ab-
stracts from this, as our aim is only to show that even under the weaker assumption of 
collective responsibility, trade and payment with credit is supported. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Tradable assets emerged in Europe in the context of fragmented city jurisdictions, 
where the prospects for contract enforcement looked rather limited. This paper studies 
the effects of contract enforcement through the medieval institution of communal re-
sponsibility, which held all traders of a given city liable for each others’ debts when 
trading abroad. We examined evidence collected by legal and economic historians on 
communal responsibility and its regulation in town statutes across Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe, and found that it served helped to collateralize debt quite effectively. 
Medieval cities acted as market makers, ensuring the safe use of credit instruments   40
through the threat of applying communal responsibility. The emerging financial mar-
kets soon integrated regionally and across time, following the rhythm of the large na-
tional and European fairs. The fragmentation of jurisdictions did little to disturb this 
process, as communal responsibility gave every trader a strong individual incentive 
not to default. 
 
Our paper also examines the effects of communal responsibility in a matching model 
of money demand à la Lagos and Wright (2003), interpreted as a village economy as 
in Faig (2004) and Faig and Jerez (2005), and makes a contribution to the literature on 
coexistence of money and credit in monetary search equilibrium. If there is a fixed but 
sufficiently low fixed cost of credit in trade across cities (such as notary and court 
register fees), cash and credit may coexist in equilibrium, provided the claims are en-
forceable.  
 
The contribution of our paper is twofold. On the one hand, we find that the medieval 
and institution of communal responsibility, by which each city’s merchant was held 
liable abroad for any claims on his fellow citizens, was highly effective in enforcing 
contracts across cities, and thus enabled financial markets to integrate even in the ab-
sence of territorial jurisdictions. On the other hand, we find that in the context of a 
random matching model of trade, communal responsibility is an enforcement device 
that supports the use of credit in equilibrium even if individual traders are anonymous, 
so long as they can be identified by their citizenship.  
 
We see this research as a first step towards providing an integrating framework for the 
analysis of the demand for money and assets in a pre-modern economy, including also   41
the issue of commodity money, gold inflation, and debasement. We also find that 
modeling devices that are common in the literature on monetary matching, like big 
families or other risk-sharing arrangements, are closer to historical reality than it 
might first seem. Also, the medieval practice of forming guilds can be interpreted as a 
reaction to communal responsibility, born out of the need to limit fee riding on other 
merchants within the same city. We see this as a promising field for further research.  
 
References 
Boerner, Lars, 2005, The Evolution of the Boundaries of the Firm, manuscript. 
Boyer-Xambeu, Marie-Therèse, Ghislain Deleplace, and Lucien Gillard, 1991, Gold-
standard, Währung und Finanz im 16. Jahrhundert, in Michael North, ed.: 
Kredit im spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Europa (Böhlau, Vien-
na). 
Brübach, Nils, 1994. Die Reichsmessen von Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig und Braun-
schweig (Franz Steiner, Stuttgart). 
de Roover, Raymond, 1953. L'Evolution de la Lettre de Change. XIV
e-XVIII
e siècles 
(Librairie Armand Colin, Paris). 
Faig, Miquel, 2004, Money and Banking in an Economy with Villages, manuscript. 
Faig, Miquel, and Belen Jerez, 2005, Inflation, Prices, and Information in Competitive 
Search, manuscript. 
Freundt, Carl, 1899. Das Wechselrecht der Postglossatoren (Duncker & Humblot, 
Leipzig). 
Goldschmidt, Levin, 1891. Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts (Stuttgart). 
Greif, Avner, 1993, Contract Enforcement and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, American Economic Review 83, 525-548. 
Greif, Avner, 2004, Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law: the Community Re-
sponsibility System, Chicago Journal of International Law 5, 109-138. 
He, Ping, Lixin Huang, and Randall Wright, 2003, Money and Banking in Search 
Equilibrium, manuscript. 
Kisch, Guido, 1914. Der deutsche Arrestprozess (Tempsky, Wien). 
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright, 1989, On Money as a Medium of Exchange, 
Journal of Political Economy 97, 927-954. 
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright, 1991, A Contribution to the Pure Theory of 
Money, Journal of Economic Theory 53, 215-235. 
Lagos, Ricardo, and Randall Wright, 2005, A Unified Framework for Monetary The-
ory and Policy Analysis, Journal of Political Economy 113, 463-484. 
Munro, John, 1991, Die Anfänge der Übertragbarkeit: Einige Kreditinnovationen im 
englisch-flämischen Handel des Spätmittelalters (1360-1540), in Michael 
North, ed.: Kredit im spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Europa 
(Böhlau, Vienna).   42
Munro, John, 1994, The International Law Merchant and the Evolution of Negotiable 
Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, in John Munro, ed.: 
Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of Late-Medieval 
England and the Low Countries (Ashgate, Aldershot). 
North, Douglass, 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, New 
York). 
Planitz, Hans, 1919, Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Arrestprozesses, Zeit-
schrift der Savigny-Stiftung fuer Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung 
40, 87-198. 
Rausch, Wilhelm, 1969. Die Geschichte der Linzer Märkte im Mittelalter (J. Wim-
mer, Linz). 
Rothmann, Michael, 1998. Die Frankfurter Messen im Mittelalter (Franz Steiner, 
Stuttgart). 
Schaps, Georg, 1892. Zur Geschichte des Wechselindossaments (Ferdinand Enke, 
Stuttgart). 
Schaube, Adolf, 1898, Zur Geschichte und Natur des ältesten Cambium, Jahrbücher 
für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 70, 603-621. 
Shi, Shouyong, 1997, A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money, Econometrica 65, 75-
102. 
Simon, Volker, 1974. Der Wechsel als Träger des internationalen Zahlungsverkehrs 
in den Finanzzentren Südwestdeutschlands und der Schweiz (Müller & Gräff, 
Stuttgart). 
Thomas, Heinz, 1977, Beitraege zur Geschichte der Champagne-Messen im 14. Jahr-
hundert, Vierteljahrschrift fuer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 64, 433-467. 
Usher, A.P., 1943. The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.). 
van der Wee, Herman, 1963. The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European 
Economy (Den Haag). 
von Stromer, Wolfgang, 1976, Die oberdeutschen Geld- und Kreditmärkte. Ihre Ent-
wicklung vom Spätmittelalter bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg, Scripta Merca-
turae 10, 23-51. 
Wach, Adolf, 1868. Der Arrestprozess in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Leip-
zig). 
   43
Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1.  
Let B be the maximizer of the Nash bargaining problem: 
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Insert (II) into (I) to find  *) ~ ( ' *) ~ ( ' ~ q N q u = . The derivative properties of u ~and  N 
ensure that q* and hence d* (if they exist) must be positive. Verification of the 
second-order conditions is straightforward. 
 
Remark: This is a special case of Lagos and Wright (2003), Lemma 2, for the case 
where the cash constraint on d is not binding. Our setup is simplified with respect to 
Lagos and Wright in the sense that bonds exist and Ponzi schemes are ruled out by a 
transversality condition. Then, the cash constraint never binds. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
1. We first show that if and only if the fixed cost of payment with bills is positive, 
money demand will be at least high enough to pay for transactions in a low-quality 
match:  0 ~ > ⇔ ≥ T q m .   44
 
For this to be true, the expected value from paying with a mixture of cash and bonds 
(.)} {
) (mb W E  must be higher than the value from a pure credit arrangement 
(.)} { ) (b W E . Due to its linearity,  (.) W  has the additivity property 
) ( ) ( ) ( B A W B W A W + = + .  
 
: " "⇒  We first observe that the trial solution  q m m = = ~ is preferred to a cashless 
equilibrium  0 ~ = m  if: 
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Under the trial solution, if a high quality match is established, bills of exchange equal 
to  q q b − =
~
 will be issued in the morning. In a bad state, payments are by cash only. 
An agent paying exclusively by credit will face the same budget constraint in a good 
match. However, in a low-quality match, an agent paying only by credit now needs to 
bear the fixed cost of payment by credit as well. The value from doing so is lower 
than that of reserving cash for the purpose. 
 
: " "⇐  Now assume  m m < < ~ 0 . Then,  
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If the level of money demand m ~ is positive but below the threshold m , the value 
associated with this level,  } { ) ~ ( m m W E < , is lower than the value associated with m .   45
Hence, if the transaction cost of paying with bills is positive, money demand is at 
least m . This completes the first part of the proof.  
 
2. We now establish that under Assumptions 1 and 2, money demand, which we know 
from the above to be positive and at least equal to q, is actually no bigger than q, i.e. 
] [ ) 1 ( ~ m m i T q m − ⋅ − < ⇔ ≤ α α . We first have to show that under the assumptions, 
the value of holding  m m = ~  is higher than the value of a pure cash-in-advance 
arrangement  (.) ) (m W . In a second step we show that money holdings higher than 
m will generate lower value than the one associated with m . 
 
: " "⇒   We first observe that the trial solution  q m m = = ~  is preferred to a pure cash-









( [ ) 0 ( } {









b m a i m a
b m a i b m a W W E
m a i m a




+ − + − ⋅ − +
+ − + + − ⋅ + = >
− + − ⋅ − +





4 8 47 6
 
 
{ 4 3 42 1
demand money ary precaution
reducing from savings











− − > − ⇒
 
 
In the above expression for  } { ) (m W E , the cash payment in the good match is m , 
which is equivalent to expenditure  b m
~
+  in the good match of mixed cash/credit 
case. The cash payment in the bad match is the lower amount m . In the pure cash in 
advance economy of  } { ) (m W E , the interest cost of holding cash for both 
contingencies is  )
~
( b m i m i + = , while the cost of holding cash in the mixed 
cash/credit economy of  } { ) (mb W E is the lower amount  m i . Evaluation of the   46
conditions leads right back to Assumption 2, which proves the “if” part: under the 
assumption, a combination of cash and credit is preferred to cash only. 
: " "⇐  Now assume  m m m < < ~ . Then, 
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If cash holdings exceed the value associated with purchases in the low match but fall 
short of a pure cash-in-advance condition, i.e. for  m m m < < ~ , the associated value is 
lower than for m . The reason is that if a bad match is realized, agents holding 
m m m < < ~  have unmatched cash holdings  m m − ~  whose interest cost is  ) ~ ( m m i − . By 
reducing cash holdings to m , the interest costs on the excess cash are reduced to zero. 
Thus,  m m ≤ ~ , which completes the second part of the proof. 
 
Taking both parts of the proof together, under assumptions 1 and 2,  . ~ m m m ≤ ≤  
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
We need to prove that money holdings m ~ are always bounded. From the proof of 
Proposition 1, money demand is finite and bounded away from zero under 
Assumptions 1 and 2:  0 ~ > = = q m m . Hence we only need to examine what happens if 
Assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. As to Assumption 1,  0 > T , it follows immediately 
from the first part of the proof of Proposition 1 that  0 ~ 0 = ⇔ = m T : there is no 
demand for money if the use of credit is costless. This establishes the lower bound on 
money demand.  
 
As to Assumption 2,  ] [ ) 1 ( m m i T − ⋅ − < α α , the proof of Proposition 1 implies that if 
the fixed cost of credit is high,  q m m m i T ≥ ⇒ − ⋅ − > ~ ] [ ) 1 ( α α . To show that the   47
strict equality holds, consider the value of holding cash at level  q m m = = ~  , denoted 
before as  } {
) (m W E , and compare it to the value of holding a higher amount of cash 
+ + = m q m ~ , to be denoted at } { ) ( + m W E . Then: 
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Agents holding m will face interest cost on their cash holdings  ) ( m a i − . Agents 
holding cash in excess of that level,  + + = m q m ~ , will face higher interest cost. The 
difference in values of holding just m or  + + = m q m ~  is positive: 
 
0 } { } {
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+ + m i W E W E
m m   
      
which implies that  q m = is indeed the highest upper bound for money demand. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
(preliminary) 
We first obtain the value function at the optimized levels, and then check its 
boundedness conditions. To obtain the value function, we insert the bargaining 
outcomes and obtain: 
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Due to the concavity of u and convexity of N, ) (a v is strictly concave in a (keeping in 
mind that d is linear). However, it is unbounded above. It is also unbounded below, as 
−∞ = = ) 0 ( ) 0 ( U u . Moreover, V(a) is unbounded above because of its linearity in a. 
We must therefore provide upper bounds. The strategy will be to use the constraints 
on the endowment process and insert these into  ) (a v  and V(a), respectively. 
 
The boundedness of  ) (a v  follows directly from the solution of the bargaining 
problem in Lemma 1: As  ∞ < < ) ( * 0 a q  and as u and N are continuous in q, they are 
bounded from above and below,  ∞ < < *) ( *), ( 0 q N q u . For the general good, 
∞ < < *) *), ( ( 0 X X U  follows from (2) in the text and from the regularity condition 
1 *) ( ' = C U  for some  0 *> C .  
 
To find an upper bound for V(a), note that Proposition 2 implied that under 
Assumptions 1 and 2, an upper bound for money holdings is  . 0 > = q m By Lemma 2, 
if Assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold, the upper bound for money holdings is 
. 0 > = q m  As a consequence, the transversality condition on bond holdings translates 
into a transversality condition on total assets:  
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where  m ~  assumes the values  0 > = q m  or  0 > = q m , depending on whether 
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold or not. Assuming a finite initial value  0 0 > a , V(a) must 
therefore be bounded. To see this, write  ) ( o a V as: 
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Taking limits (which is equivalent to continuing the above substitution process 
indefinitely): 
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The second term on the right hand side of this term is zero. In the first term, 
) ( ), ( a u a v and ) (a d are bounded. It remains to evaluate the linear terms in  t a . As the 
sequence  t
ta β converges to zero from above, the series generated by the partial sums 
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Thus,  ) ( o a V is bounded from above. The remainder of the proof is a special case of 
Lemma 7 in Lagos and Wright (2005). 
 